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Note
Actions Speak Louder than Thoughts:
The Constitutionally Questionable Reach of the
Minnesota CLE Elimination of Bias Requirement
Kari M. Dahlin*
Submission to elimination of bias training is a precondition
to the licensed practice of law in Minnesota.' The Minnesota
Supreme Court requires that all lawyers attend two hours of
elimination of bias training every three years to fulfill their
continuing legal education (CLE) requirements.2 The require-
ment exists to "educate attorneys to identify and eliminate
from the legal profession and from the practice of law, biases
against persons because of race, gender, economic status, creed,
color, religion, national origin, disability, age or sexual orienta-
tion."3 Failure to attend a prescribed number of sessions re-
sults in the loss of one's license to practice law in Minnesota.4
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 1998,
University of Minnesota-Twin Cities. I would like to thank my mother,
Annette Dahlin, for her love and support, and my brother, Brian Dahlin, for
his friendship and sense of humor. I would also like to thank Professor Jim
Chen for helpful comments and suggestions. Finally, I especially wish to
thank Jordan Lorence for his advice and encouragement.
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court's June 28, 1996 Order, Promulgation
of Amendments to the Rules for Continuing Legal Education of Members of the
Bar, mandated that lawyers receive continuing legal education "elimination of
bias" training. Promulgation of Amendments to the Rules for Continuing Legal
Education of Members of the Bar, Minnesota Supreme Court Order C2-84-
2163, FIN. & COM. APP. COURTS ED., July 5, 1996, at 26-28 [hereinafter Bias
Order].
2. See id. at 26 (explaining the rules for reporting continuing education).
3. Id. at 27 (defining the requisite purpose of a "[c]ourse in the elimina-
tion of bias in the legal profession and in the practice of law").
4. See id. at 26 (noting that "[elach registered attorney duly admitted to
practice in this state desiring active status must make a written report to the
Board in such manner and form as the Board shall prescribe"). The Report of
Continuing Education must provide "evidence of attendance at a minimum of
two hours of courses in the elimination of bias in the legal profession and in
the practice of law." Id.
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The elimination of bias requirement has created a number
of controversies in the Minnesota legal community.5 Propo-
nents of the requirement partly base their allegations of bias on
the Racial Bias Task Force Report 6 and the Hennepin County
Bar Association Gay and Lesbian Issues Subcommittee Report.7
Scholars and attorneys have objected to the accuracy of these
reports, arguing that they fail to prove the existence of bias in
the legal profession. Opponents contend that methodological
and interpretive flaws cast doubt on the validity of conclusions
contained in the reports.8 In addition to the technical flaws of
these studies, the mere existence of an elimination of bias re-
quirement raises constitutional questions about the right to
speak as well as negative free speech rights-the right not to
speak, and the right not to listen.
This Note evaluates the constitutionality of the elimination
of bias requirement in the context of negative free speech
rights. Part I explains the character of negative free speech
rights and traces the methods used by the Supreme Court to
evaluate compelled speech cases. Part II applies the Supreme
Court's negative free speech analytical methods to the elimina-
tion of bias requirement and details the requirement's constitu-
tional difficulties. Finally, Part III concludes that the broad
reach of the elimination of bias requirement unconstitutionally
infringes on lawyers' negative free speech rights and advocates
5. See Peter A. Swanson, Do Lawyers Need Sensitivity Training?, LAW &
POL., July 1996, at 17-18 (criticizing the addition of the elimination of bias
course requirement).
6. TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS, MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, FINAL
REPORT (April 30, 1993). Former Minnesota Supreme Court Chief Justice
A.M. (Sandy) Keith created the task force in December of 1990 to study racial
bias in the Minnesota court system and propose reforms to eliminate it. See
id.
7. HENNEPIN COUNTY BAR ASSN DIVERSITY COMM., LESBIAN & GAY
ISSUES SUBCOMM., LEGAL EMPLOYERS' BARRIERS TO ADVANCEMENT AND TO
ECONOMIC EQUALITY BASED UPON SEXUAL ORIENTATION (1995) [hereinafter
SEXUAL ORIENTATION REPORT].
8. For example, the self-selection of interviewees in the Sexual Orienta-
tion Report could have predetermined some of the report's conclusions. See
infra note 26 and accompanying text; see also David Peterson, Accuracy or Ad-
vocacy? Bias Report Challenged, STAR TRM., June 27, 1993, at 2B (quoting
University of Minnesota Law School professor Richard Frase's comment that
the racial bias task force report is "not only not scholarly, it's not even even-
handed" and University of Minnesota sociologist David Ward's comment that
"[i]t's the most biased report I've seen in a long time"); infra note 25 and ac-
companying text.
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that it be replaced with measures solely targeting overt dis-
criminatory actions.
I. THE LAW SURROUNDING THE ELIMINATION OF
BIAS REQUIREMENT
A. THE MINNESOTA CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
ELIMINATION OF BIAS REQUIREMENT
The State Board of Continuing Legal Education9 oversees
the implementation of the elimination of bias rule. The Board
controls the content of the seminars since all potential elimina-
tion of bias course providers must apply to the Board for ac-
creditation.' 0 The Board bases its decision to grant credit on
whether the course fulfills the "learning goals" of the elimina-
tion of bias program." These learning goals seek to educate
9. The Minnesota Supreme Court Order founded the State Board of Con-
tinuing Legal Education. See Bias Order, supra note 1, at 26.
10. See id. The Board, directly answerable to the court, "accredit[s]
courses and programs which will satisfy the educational requirements of these
rules" and "discover[s] and encourage[s] the offering of such courses and pro-
grams." Id. The Special Continuing Legal Education Advisory Committee on
Elimination of Bias requires that CLE providers seeking elimination of bias
credit review the goals of the elimination of bias program and explain how
their proposed seminar fulfills them. See SPECIAL CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION ADVISORY COMM., MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT
EX. A, 7 (May 21, 1996) (File No. C2-84-2163).
11. See Bias Order, supra note 1, at 28. The Supreme Court Order estab-
lishes guidelines, or "learning goals," for acceptable elimination of bias
courses. See id. The requirements are as follows:
Courses approved as "elimination of bias" must be at least 60 con-
tinuous minutes in duration, must be directly related to the practice
of law, must meet all other requirements of Rule 101 of the Rules of
the CLE Board, and must be designed to meet one or more of the fol-
lowing goals:
1. to educate attorneys about the elimination of bias or prejudice in
the legal profession, in the practice of law, and/or in the admini-
stration of justice;
2. to educate attorneys regarding barriers to hiring, retention, pro-
motion, professional development and full participation of lawyers
of color, women, and those persons referenced in the "elimination
of bias" definition (I.) of the Rules of the CLE Board, both in the
public and private sector of the legal profession and in the prac-
tice of law;
3. to educate attorneys about the problems identified in the Su-
preme Court's Race Bias and Gender Fairness Task Force Re-
ports, as well as in other studies, reports or treatises which de-
scribe bias and prejudice in the legal profession, in the practice of
law, and/or in the administration ofjustice.
2000] 1727
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lawyers about studies of race, gender, and sexual orientation
bias in the practice of law.12 Thus, in order to meet these
learning goals, a course must disseminate the results of these
reports. Unfortunately, an examination of the bias order and
the contents of the reports casts doubt on whether the seminars
are merely means of educating lawyers about biases.
The language of the bias order evinces the potential of this
rule to attempt to change lawyers' belief systems, presenting
possible constitutional difficulties despite the purportedly edu-
cative objectives of the courses. The Board defines an accept-
able elimination of bias course as one "designed to educate at-
torneys to identify and eliminate... biases." 13 Attorney Mark
Greenberg argues that this characterization "is not dispositive
of the constitutional question."14 Rather, he describes elimina-
tion of bias courses as "[miandatory classes for adults on sub-
jects that depend more on the formation of character, the incul-
cation of norms, and the assessment of broad personal
experience, rather than on the examination of a well-defined
body of knowledge." 15 Cloaking the elimination of bias re-
quirement in the guise of "education" does not remove its con-
stitutional difficulties.
The Racial Bias Task Force report reaches conflicting con-
clusions about the effects of alleged racial bias in the criminal
justice system and therefore does not demonstrate a compelling
12. See id. Although the learning goals do not specifically mention the
sexual orientation report, it would be covered under the language "other
studies ... which describe bias." Id.
13. Id. at 26.
14. Appellants' Reply Brief at 22, Greenberg v. State Bar, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d
493 (Ct. App. 2000) (No. 682931-9). The State Bar of California requires its
lawyers to attend mandatory elimination of bias courses. See CALIFORNIA
MINIMUM CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION RULES AND REGULATIONS § 2.1.3
(1996). Objecting attorneys filed suit against the requirement, claiming viola-
tions of First Amendment rights and asking for declaratory and injunctive re-
lief. See Appellants' Petition for Review at 2, Greenberg, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 493,
petition for cert. filed (Feb. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Petition]. A California ap-
pellate court recently upheld the constitutionality of the elimination of bias
program, holding the requirement "germane" to "the apparent consumer pro-
tection goals of the [mandatory continuing legal education] program." Green-
berg, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496. Although the Minnesota elimination of bias re-
quirement has yet to face constitutional scrutiny, at least one commentator
has anticipated a challenge to the rule. See Swanson, supra note 5, at 17 (ex-
pressing his confidence that "one of the lawyers who is forced to sit through
two hours of political indoctrination contrary to his beliefs will bring a consti-
tutional challenge to the rule").
15. Appellants' Reply Brief at 22, Greenberg, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 493.
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need for elimination of bias training. For example, the Henne-
pin County Misdemeanor Processing Analysis, a sub-report of
the task force report, does not point to a pattern of racial dis-
crimination in the Minnesota court system. 16 The report finds
that nonwhites are more likely to be arrested rather than tick-
eted, yet acknowledges that the relationship between race and
arrests is "weak."17 Additionally, when bail is set as a condition
of release from custody, there is no relationship between race
and bail amount.18 Nonwhites are more likely than whites to
have public defenders,' 9 but this disparity may have more to do
with defendants' financial circumstances, which exist inde-
pendently of any alleged bias in the legal system. Further-
more, cases against nonwhite defendants are more likely to be
dismissed than cases against white defendants.20 The report
states that there are not enough samples to reach a conclusion
regarding a possible relationship between the defendant's race
and whether his or her case goes to trial, however.21 Regarding
probation rates, the report concedes that "[rlacial differ-
ences.., are very minimal."22 While nonwhites are more likely
to receive jail sentences than whites, those nonwhites and
whites sentenced receive approximately the same amount of
jail time.23 This study provides no proof of a compelling inter-
est in eliminating racial bias in the Minnesota judicial system.
Various members of the Minnesota legal community have
questioned the Task Force's interpretation of its findings. For
example, CLE elimination of bias faculty member Scott John-
son argued that "[sihorn of its purported statistical support, the
16. See generally TASK FORCE ON RACIAL BIAS, MINNESOTA SUPREME
COURT, HENNEPIN COUNTY MISDEMEANOR PROCESSING ANALYSIS (Jan. 28,
1993) [hereinafter MISDEMEANOR PROCESSING ANALYSIS]. Greg Pulles's pres-
entation at the June 29, 1999 Minnesota Family Council Elimination of Bias
CLE offered a complete analysis of the Racial Bias Task Force Report. This
seminar, entitled "Bias in the Legal Profession? What Bias?," was docu-
mented on videotape. See Videotape: Bias in the Legal Profession (Northstar
Legal Center 1999) (on file with the Minnesota Family Council) [hereinafter
Bias in the Legal Profession]. For a discussion of the First Amendment issues
surrounding the Board's approval of the Minnesota Family Council's course,
see infra notes 168-77 and accompanying text.
17. See MISDEMEANOR PROCESSING ANALYSIS, supra note 16, at 4.
18. See id. at 5-6.
19. See id. at 8.
20. See id. at 11-12.
21. See id. at 7.
22. Id. at 13.
23. See id. at 14-15.
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report... stands revealed as a shoddy, ideological tract. If, in
fact, the Minnesota judicial system were permeated with racial
bias it would be a scandal, calling for serious remedial meas-
ures beyond our sitting here for two hours once every three
years."24 Attorney and CLE elimination of bias faculty member
Roger Magnuson simply stated that "the data and the conclu-
sions don't match."25
The rule's reliance on the sexual orientation report is trou-
blesome because the report employs untrustworthy methodolo-
gies and proposes questionable remedies for the problems it
purports to document. This report, based on interviews con-
ducted with local attorneys, may stem from a biased viewpoint
because the interviewees selected themselves.26 Moreover, the
questions the Subcommittee posed to interviewees presupposed
the existence of sexual orientation bias in the legal system.27
In addition to these methodological flaws, the report is prob-
lematic because it prescribes "right" and "wrong" attitudes
about sexual orientation in order to encourage lawyers to adopt
"right" attitudes. The report disclaims an intent to change per-
sonal opinions regarding sexual orientation, recognizing that
"[slome members of the legal community have sincere and
24. Bias in the Legal Profession, supra note 16 (statement of faculty
member Scott Johnson).
25. Id. (statement of faculty member Roger Magnuson); see also Ian
Maitland, Pork-Barrel Politics Can Masquerade as True Science, STAR TRIB.,
July 14, 1995, at 19A (explaining that the racial bias task force report's find-
ings do not lead to the conclusion that Minnesota lawyers harbor racial biases,
but instead reveal that Minnesota's high black-to-white imprisonment ratio is
due to extremely low imprisonment rates for whites, and that blacks are less
likely to be imprisoned in Minnesota than in other states); Peterson, supra
note 8, at 2B (quoting University of Minnesota scholars critical of the report
for its sharply biased conclusions). But see id. (quoting Federal District Judge
Michael Davis's rejoinder that the task force was unbiased and "brought in
people with different views").
26. The Subcommittee recruited interviewees by "plac[ing] advertise-
ments for the interview sessions in legal and community periodicals most
likely read by lesbian and gay legal professionals." SEXUAL ORIENTATION
REPORT, supra note 7, at 12.
27. The Subcommittee posed the following questions to interviewees:
(1) Is there a glass ceiling for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
lawyers and law office personnel in the Twin Cities legal community?
(2) Are lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender lawyers and law office
personnel hired, retained and promoted at the same pace as their
heterosexual counterparts? (3) What are Twin Cities lawyers doing to
correct problems that exist? (4) Which programs have worked and
which have not?
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deeply held religious and moral convictions that proscribe
same-sex sexual behavior," and that "[an employer can fully
respect an individual's religious beliefs and moral convictions
while at the same time requiring that that individual's behav-
ior comply with human and civil rights laws."28 The contents of
the report do not comport with this statement, however.
The inconsistency is subtly apparent throughout the re-
port. First, it recommends that law firms condition lawyers'
professional advancement opportunities on participation in di-
versity training sessions.29 Second, the Subcommittee suggests
viewing Inside Out,3 0 a popular videotape, as an appropriate
activity for these programs.31 This recommendation is discon-
certing because some elements of Inside Out may offend some
lawyers' personal and religious beliefs. All of the production's
statements about same-sex sexual orientation are positive.32 In
contrast, all of the production's statements about "intolerance"
of same-sex sexual orientation are negative.33 For example, one
interviewee explains that he had trouble coming to terms with
his same-sex sexual orientation because "[he] was into this
thing that lots of Christians are into that if you pray hard
enough about this it's going to get well, right, and you're going
to get better."34 In addition, the production contains a still pho-
tograph of protestors holding placards that state "Fags burn in
hell" and "God's given fags up."35 The production's depiction of
the protestors is objectionable because it implies that it is
"wrong" to share the sentiments expressed on the placards.36
Further, it implies that all people who have religious objections
to same-sex sexual behavior necessarily share these senti-
ments. Some lawyers who object to same-sex sexual behavior
on religious grounds might disagree with these opinions, how-
ever. Their disagreement could leave them with no choice but
to publicly disassociate themselves from the protestors' views.
28. Id. at 9-10.
29. See id. at 43.
30. Videotape: Inside Out (Ron Albers & Abby Ginzberg 1994) (on file
with the William Mitchell College of Law Career Services Library).
31. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION REPORT, supra note 7, at 43.
32. See Inside Out, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Id. (statement of attorney Randy Rice).
35. Id.
36. The author merely defends the right of lawyers to hold these senti-
ments without defending the sentiments themselves.
20001 1731
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The report's appendices also contain material that targets
lawyers' personal beliefs. Appendix B reprints a letter to em-
ployees of a major Twin Cities law firm in which the managing
partner speaks of the "challenge" of dealing "with... homopho-
bia."37 The letter pledges support to employees who may have
difficulties accepting a co-worker's same-sex sexual orientation,
stating that "just as the Firm will be supportive of those who
make the difficult decision to come out, it will also be suppor-
tive of those who may struggle with the decisions of their co-
workers. The challenges of homosexuality and homophobia will
be met... ."38 Although this statement implies tolerance of ini-
tial bias against same-sex sexual orientation, it seems to indi-
cate a long-term goal of completely eliminating the bias. Simi-
larly, Appendix C offers a sample employer equal opportunity
statement that "challenges all employees to recognize the value
of diversity in the workplace," and to "identify practices, atti-
tudes or systems which undermine our commitment to diver-
sity in the workplace." 39 The hypothetical firm includes sexual
orientation in its definition of "diversity" and specifically states
that lawyers must examine their personal beliefs so as not to
undermine the firm's commitment to its conception of diver-
sity.40
These examples may seem trivial, but their significance
cannot be discounted. Some lawyers might resent the implica-
tion that they harbor racial biases, while other lawyers might
resent the implication that any biases they may have are
"wrong." Likewise, some lawyers may consider it a violation of
their personal and religious beliefs to be required to listen to
speech that paints biases against same-sex sexual behavior in a
bad light. Attorney and CLE elimination of bias faculty mem-
ber Greg Pulles explains that he opposes the requirement be-
cause he "[doesn't] like anybody telling [him] what [he] ought to
think."4' An attendee at one seminar expressed dissatisfaction
with the requirement, stating that "[all of the presenters pro-
moted the same political agenda ... ."42 Although this speech
37. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION REPORT, supra note 7, app. B.
38. Id.
39. Id. app. C.
40. See id.
41. Telephone Interview with Greg Pulles, Attorney and CLE Elimination
of Bias Faculty Member (Nov. 16, 1999).
42. MINNESOTA BD. OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., REPORT OF THE BOARD
OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION ON ELIMINATION OF BIAS CLE 6 (1998)
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may not be objectionable to many lawyers, courts cannot judge
the reasons why some lawyers, albeit a minority, would find
these ideas objectionable.43 These examples, part of the body of
research from which course providers may draw, indicate that
the rule permits attempts to change individual attitudes, a
practice that the First Amendment forbids.
B. THE RIGHT NOT To SPEAK
The First Amendment guarantees both affirmative and
negative free speech rights." Affirmative free speech rights re-
fer to an individual's right to engage in expressive activity,
such as leafleting on public streets,45 staging protest marches,46
and burning the United States flag.47 The Court guards af-
firmative free speech rights for a number of reasons, including
protecting the marketplace of ideas, promoting intelligent self-
government, and preserving "individual dignity and choice." 48
The compelling nature of these interests means that the gov-
ernment may curtail an individual's affirmative right to free
expression only in limited circumstances.49
[hereinafter ELIMINATION OF BIAS REPORT].
43. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 575, 580-81 (1995) (holding that the Court could not evaluate the pa-
rade organizers' reason for wanting to exclude a gay, lesbian, and bisexual
group from their parade, and noting that "it boils down to the choice of a
speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is pre-
sumed to lie beyond the government's power to control").
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573 ("[O]ne
who chooses to speak may also decide 'vhat not to say.'"); Riley v. National
Fed'n for the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988) ('[F]reedom of
speech'... necessarily compris[es] the decision of both what to say and what
not to say."); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("[T]he right of
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action in-
cludes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at
all.... [These rights] are complementary components of the broader concept of
'individual freedom of mind.'" (citation omitted)); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) ("IT]he
right of freedom of thought and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution
against State action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all .... ").
45. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939).
46. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1965).
47. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
48. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
49. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521-22 (1972) ("[Govern-
ment statutes] must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to
punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to pro-
tected expression. 'Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space
20001 1733
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The government may limit affirmative expression in the
contexts of obscenity, advocacy of imminent and likely illegal
conduct, and fighting words. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
the Court upheld a speaker's conviction for standing on a public
sidewalk in the presence of the city marshall and calling the
marshall a "Fascist" and a "racketeer."50 The Court held that
Chaplinsky's speech constituted fighting words, "which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace."51 In Miller v. California, the Court held
that the appellant's mailing unsolicited obscene pictures did
not warrant First Amendment protection because the pictures
lacked "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."52
Furthermore, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court held that the
government could restrict affirmative expression when it in-
cites imminent illegal conduct.53 Applying this principle, the
Court granted protection to a Ku Klux Klan leader's statements
organizing a Fourth of July march on Congress, deeming the
words "mere advocacy" and noting the unlikelihood that the
march would occur. 54
Just as citizens are free to speak, they are also free to re-
frain from speaking.55 Negative free speech rights refer to the
inability of government to coerce its citizens into speaking.56
The government cannot require a person to disseminate, 57 as-
sociate himself with,58 or listen to a message with which he dis-
to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.'"
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963))).
The government may curtail affirmative free expression with reasonable,
content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions. See Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802-03 (1989) (sustaining a requirement that city offi-
cials operate the Central Park sound system in the interest of limiting noise);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-18 (1972) (upholding a regula-
tion prohibiting protests on school grounds during school hours).
50. 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
51. Id. at 572.
52. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
53. 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (per curiam).
54. See id.
55. See supra note 44 (citing cases in which the Supreme Court affirmed
the right to refrain from speaking).
56. Negative First Amendment rights become an issue when "[o]ne party
is compelled to subsidize or facilitate the speech of another, rather than liter-
ally to speak." Robert D. Kamenshine, Reflections on Coerced Expression, 34
LAND & WATER L. REV. 101, 102 (1999).
57. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
58. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 575 (1995).
1734 [Vol. 84:1725
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agrees.5 9 The Court protects negative free speech rights to pre-
serve the individual's interest in self-determination.60 Just as
the values of "individual dignity and choice"61 are prominent in
affirmative First Amendment jurisprudence, they are central to
negative First Amendment analysis. Government-compelled
speech is constitutionally questionable because it deprives in-
dividuals of autonomy over their speech.6 2 This deprivation
exists in two forms: it prevents individuals from choosing the
manner in which they present themselves to their communi-
ties6 3 and it prevents individuals from enjoying freedom of con-
science.64
59. See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (holding that
political candidates did not have the right to advertise on streetcars for fear of
making passengers a captive audience to political campaign literature). But
cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(allowing states to require that a woman seeking an abortion "be informed of
the availability of information relating to fetal development and the assistance
available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to fufll term"). Casey is dis-
tinguishable from the situation at hand because it involved a measure de-
signed to ensure that a woman's decision to have an abortion is fully informed.
See id. The requirement is not meant to change a woman's opinion on abor-
tion; rather, it "furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a
woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psycho-
logical consequences, that her decision was not fully informed." Id. at 832.
The elimination of bias requirement presents no issues of physical or mental
health.
60. See David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Govern-
ment Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995, 1004 (1982)
(arguing that compelled recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance "infringe[s] upon
what may be called the individual's interest in selfhood").
61. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,24 (1971).
62. See Gaebler, supra note 60, at 1004.
63. Because individuals have an autonomy interest in determining how
others will perceive them, they have the right to control their own speech. See
id. at 1004-05; cf City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) (noting that
signs placed on private residences "provide information about the identity of
the 'speaker").
64. See Gaebler, supra note 60, at 1004-05. The Court has upheld free-
dom of conscience and privacy of the mind in several cases. See Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 n.2, 714 (1977) (noting George Maynard's state-
ment that the motto requirement "conflict[ed] with [his] conscience" and there-
fore upholding his 'individual freedom of mind" (quoting West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943))); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (holding that private possession and viewing of porno-
graphic material warrants First Amendment protection); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (recognizing a privacy interest in per-
sonal thoughts); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (striking the requirement that all
students salute the United States flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance).
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C. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF COMPELLED SPEECH
LAW
Although the Supreme Court has analyzed and developed a
relatively coherent body of affirmative First Amendment law, it
has failed to articulate a clear standard of review for violations
of negative First Amendment rights.65 The Court's limited re-
view of negative First Amendment rights cases66 has not con-
clusively defined the level of constitutional protection afforded
to negative First Amendment rights.67 Confusion surrounding
this area of law is due in part to the difficulty in determining
what constitutes an unacceptable violation of an individual's
negative free speech rights.68 A finding that a government
65. The Supreme Court has applied a varying, fact-based approach to
compelled speech cases rather than making "principled distinctions" based on
the "varying first amendment interests at stake in the different factual situa-
tions encountered." Leora Harpaz, Justice Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy: The
Supreme Court Struggles to Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV.
817, 913, 902 (1986).
66. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group,
515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995) (holding that the South Boston Allied War Veterans
Council could not be compelled to grant the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston a permit to march in their annual St. Patrick's Day-
Evacuation Day parade); Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990) (holding
that integrated state bar associations could not use mandatory member dues
to fund ideological activities unrelated to the goals of "regulating the legal pro-
fession and improving the quality of legal services"); PruneYard Shopping Ctr.
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (holding that a private mall owner could not
exclude protestors from his mall due to the unlikelihood that third parties
would attribute the protesters' message to the mall owner); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (holding that use of mandatory union
dues for ideological purposes unrelated to collective bargaining violated teach-
ers' negative First Amendment rights); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713 (holding that
New Hampshire could not compel its citizens to display the state motto on the
license plates of their cars); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (holding that the West
Virginia Board of Education could not compel students to salute the United
States flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance).
67. Absent countervailing factors, see supra notes 50-54 and accompany-
ing text, the presumptive standard of review for affirmative First Amendment
rights cases is strict scrutiny. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270
(1981). Conversely, the Court's fact-based approach in negative First
Amendment analysis leaves the standard of review for these cases in doubt.
The Court and legal scholars have suggested that negative free speech viola-
tions vary along a spectrum of severity and should be evaluated accordingly.
See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715; Harpaz, supra note 65, at 902-04 (suggesting a
two-tier approach for compelled speech cases, with severe violations receiving
strict scrutiny, and comparatively minor violations receiving intermediate
scrutiny).
68. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 & n.15 (1977) (holding that requiring New
Hampshire drivers to display the state motto on their license plates unconsti-
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regulation implicates negative First Amendment issues does
not necessarily mean the regulation is unconstitutional. The
Court has upheld restrictions on negative free speech rights
when those restrictions were supported by a compelling gov-
ernment interest.69 Doctrinal uncertainty also permeates com-
pelled speech cases because the Court applies a variety of ana-
lytical methods in reaching negative free speech decisions.
These methods are the freedom of conscience test, the trace-
ability test, and the ends-means balancing test.
1. The Freedom of Conscience Test: Protecting Autonomy
Over One's Mind
The freedom of conscience test asks whether the contested
government regulation interferes with an individual's freedom
of mind. The First Amendment guarantees personal mental
autonomy and the right to self-determination."° The Supreme
Court has held that the government infringes on an individ-
ual's freedom of conscience when it denies his First Amend-
ment right to contemplate anything.71 Some scholars argue
that if an individual is forced to disseminate or fund a message
with which he disagrees, he loses control over his mind.72 If an
individual is compelled to express or listen to speech with
which he disagrees, he:
is likely to view compliance as acquiescence in, if not as outright af-
firmation of, the views involuntarily expressed. Consequently one
who submits to such compulsion is likely to feel humiliated and
ashamed that he did not stand up for his own beliefs. Thus, for the
state to compel expression constitutes a direct and powerful affront to
tutionally violated petitioners' negative free speech rights, but recognizing
that the presence of the United States' motto on currency did not).
69. See, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36 (noting the ideological nature of
collective bargaining, yet upholding the use of mandatory teachers' union dues
to promote smooth labor negotiations).
70. See cases cited supra note 64 (documenting the Court's recognition of
the right to freedom of conscience and explaining its importance for the indi-
vidual).
71. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
72. Victor Brudney argues:
[Tihe thwarting of the individual's will and the intrusion on the indi-
vidual's conscience by the group's expression that the individual is
forced to enable is as present in the case of restricting individual
speech as in the case of "compelling" speech.... [T]he intrusion on
the individual's will to speak is real, and the jurisprudence of the
First Amendment is properly invocable.
Victor Brudney, Association, Advocacy, and the First Amendment, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 15 (1995).
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the individual as an individual because it requires a denial of the self
and represents the ultimate submission of the individual-submission
of mind.7
3
Thus, individuals unwillingly face an internal conflict between
their own beliefs and those of the state, thereby losing the right
to hold opinions in the quiet of their minds. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has carefully scrutinized regulations that in-
vade freedom of mind.
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette con-
tains a forceful defense of freedom of mind.74 In Barnette, the
Court held that the West Virginia School Board could not com-
pel students, under threat of expulsion,75 to salute the United
States flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance.76 The plaintiffs,
practicing Jehovah's Witnesses, had refused to comply with the
Board's resolution, claiming that saluting the flag and reciting
the Pledge violated their faith's prohibition against bowing to
graven images.77 According to the Court, the students' choice
not to participate was based on their "right of self-
determination in matters that touch individual opinion and
personal attitude."78 Writing for the Court, Justice Jackson
stated, "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein."'79 Thus, requiring students to participate
in a ceremony contrary to their personal beliefs deprived the
students of their right to exercise autonomy over their minds.80
2. The Traceability Test: Protecting Autonomy Over One's
Image
The traceability test protects an individual's interest in de-
termining how he will represent himself to others. 81 Trace-
73. Gaebler, supra note 60, at 1005.
74. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
75. See id. at 629.
76. See id. at 642.
77. See id. at 629.
78. Id. at 631.
79. Id. at 642.
80. See id.
81. See Gaebler, supra note 60, at 1005; see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960) (holding that teachers could not be compelled to dis-
close their organizational affiliations because disclosure would "impair that
teacher's right of free association, a right closely allied to freedom of speech
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ability analysis asks whether a third party will interpret the
coerced speech as an expression of the individual's personal be-
liefs.82 Since an individual's public speech defines how others
perceive him, imputing speech to the individual deprives him of
autonomy over his public image. Consequently, he may have to
affirmatively represent himself to the world in a different
light.83
The Court analyzes this interest on a case-by-case basis,
and the strength of the connection between the message and
the speaker bears on the Court's determination of the magni-
tude of the violation. The Court is more likely to find a consti-
tutional violation if the message appears to come directly from
the coerced speaker.84 Conversely, the Court is less likely to
find a violation when the connection between the coerced
speaker and the message is comparatively remote.85 The
Court's traceability analysis demonstrates that varying degrees
of proximity between the speaker and the message affect its
treatment of coerced speech cases.
In Wooley v. Maynard, the Court's application of the trace-
ability test led it to find an impermissible link between the
message and the coerced speakers. 86 The plaintiffs in Wooley
and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society").
82. See Gaebler, supra note 60, at 1005.
83. Coerced speech denies an individual the right to shape his public per-
sona:
If compelled expression is perceived as sincere it communicates either
the individual's true views or alternatively, and perhaps even worse,
a misimpression of the individual's views .... When one is thus de-
prived of the right to remain silent the essence of the injury to indi-
vidual negative first amendment interests is the deprivation of the
individual's freedom to decide how he will present himself to the
world.
Id.; see also Brudney, supra note 72, at 15 n.38 (providing an additional exam-
ple of the right to tailor one's public image).
84. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 575 (1995) (finding that third persons could associate the message of
parade participants with the beliefs of parade organizers); Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 717 n.15 (1977) (finding that third persons could associate a
state motto on a license plate with the owner of the car); cf. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Public Utils. Conm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1986) (holding that a private
electric company did not have to allow a private group access to its billing en-
velopes because the electric company could be associated with a message with
which it disagreed).
85. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (con-
cluding that third persons would not trace the views of protestors in a public
mall to the mall owner).
86. See 430 U.S. at 717.
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were practicing Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to comply
with a New Hampshire regulation requiring car owners to dis-
play the state motto, "Live Free or Die," on their license
plates.8 7 The Court reasoned that because third parties could
reasonably connect car owners with messages on their license
plates,88 the regulation denied the Maynards the right to con-
trol the image they presented to the public.89 Consequently,
the Maynards appeared as willing draftees in the dissemina-
tion of an ideological message with which they disagreed.90
Thus, the Court ruled that New Hampshire could not require
its citizens to display the motto on their license plates.91
In Wooley, the Court explicitly recognized that violations of
negative First Amendment rights are matters of degree. 92 For
instance, an individual would not be allowed to object to the
presence of the United States' motto, "In God We Trust," on
currency since currency "passe[s] from hand to hand" and is not
associated with single individuals.9 3 However, the Court found
that cars, unlike currency, are associated with their owners,
and outsiders could attribute the motto's message to the
Maynards.94 Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist proposed in his
dissent that the Maynards could attach a bumper sticker to
their car that explained their disagreement with the state
motto.95
87. The Maynards objected to the motto on political and religious grounds.
See id. at 707. George Maynard explained that "Jehovah's Kingdom... offers
everlasting life" and that "[i]t would be contrary to that belief to give up [his]
life for the state, even if it meant living in bondage." Id. at 707 n.2.
88. See id. at 715.
89. See id. at 717.
90. "Dissemination" accurately characterizes the state's purpose behind
the requirement, and the Court noted that this requirement had the "express
purpose that [the motto] be observed and read by the public." Id. at 713. The
Court also noted the ideological nature of the motto. See id. Mr. Maynard
stated that he "refuse[d] to be coerced by the State into advertising a slogan
which [he found] morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhorrent." Id.
(citation omitted).
91. See id. at 713, 717.
92. The Court implicitly recognized that some links between speakers and
messages are so tenuous that third parties will not attribute the coerced
speech to the speaker. See id. at 715. This recognition did not control in
Wooley because the Court found a sufficiently close connection between the
message and the Maynards' autonomy to trigger First Amendment protec-
tions. See id. at 717.
93. See id. at 717 n.15.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 722 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Rehnquist
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The Court applied the same traceability analysis in Prune-
Yard Shopping Center v. Robins as it did in Wooley, but
reached the opposite conclusion.96 PruneYard held that a pri-
vate mall owner could not constitutionally prohibit all "publicly
expressive activity, including the circulation of petitions, that is
not directly related to commercial purposes."97 Plaintiffs, a
group of high school students, had set up a table in the mall
courtyard to distribute literature and obtain petition signatures
in an effort to oppose a United Nations' Zionism resolution.98
In striking the prohibition, the Court reasoned that it was un-
likely third persons would connect the views of mall protestors
with those of the owner.99 In this case, the alleged link be-
tween the owner and the students' message did not exist be-
cause the mall was "open to the public to come and go as they
please."1°°  Moreover, PruneYard involved no government-
prescribed message, thus eliminating the concern in Wooley
that the government was discriminating in favor of a particular
viewpoint. 01 The mall owner could post signs that "disclaim
any sponsorship of the message and could explain that the per-
sons are communicating their own messages by virtue of state
law."l0
2
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group, the Court also used traceability analysis to find an im-
permissible nexus between the objectionable speech and the co-
erced messenger. 0 3 Hurley asked whether Massachusetts
could use its public accommodations law to force the South Bos-
ton Allied War Veterans Council (Council) to include the Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (GLIB)
in its annual St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade.1°4 A
unanimous Court found that parade viewers would associate
the ideologies of the marchers with the parade organizers. 05
concluded that the regulation did not implicate First Amendment concerns be-
cause the Maynards retained autonomy over their speech. See id.
96. 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
97. Id. at 77.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 87.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id. The merits of this solution depend on the facts of the individual
case.
103. 515 U.S. 557, 575, 581 (1995).
104. See id. at 561.
105. See id. at 572-73.
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Justice Souter explained that "every participating unit affects
the message conveyed by the private organizers,"' ° and that
GLIB's presence in the parade could reasonably lead parade
viewers to conclude that the Council thought GLIB's "message
was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as
well." 0 7 Consequently, it allowed the Council to exclude GLIB
from its parade.108
3. The Court's Application of the Ends-Means Balancing Test
to Coerced Speech Cases
In addition to applying the freedom of conscience and
traceability tests, the Court will also evaluate a negative free
speech regulation by balancing the state's interests in regulat-
ing speech against individuals' free speech rights. 10 9 The Court
subjects negative free speech violations to a type of heightened
scrutiny requiring that "even though the governmental purpose
be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved."' 10 This lan-
guage does not set forth a clear standard of review, but seems
to indicate that negative free speech violations must at least be
narrowly tailored to meet a legitimate state goal. The require-
ment of narrow tailoring illustrates the relatively high value
the Court places on negative free speech rights, because neither
commercial speech 1 nor time, place, or manner restrictions n1 2
trigger such a requirement. Thus, if a regulation serves a valid
state objective and imposes only a slight infringement on nega-
tive free speech rights, the Court will likely uphold the regula-
106. Id. at 572.
107. Id. at 575.
108. See id. at 581.
109. The Wooley Court determined that negative First Amendment analy-
sis extends past the mere realization that a government regulation infringes
upon negative free speech rights. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716
(1977). The Court continued its analysis to "determine whether the State's
countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees
to display the state motto on their license plates." Id.
110. Id. (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
111. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477, 480-81 (1989)
(holding that commercial speech laws need not be the least restrictive means
of furthering the government's interest in regulating such speech).
112. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (es-
tablishing that time, place and manner restrictions "need not be the least re-
strictive or least intrusive means" of furthering the government's interest in
regulation).
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tion. Conversely, a major imposition or an illegitimate purpose
will not pass constitutional scrutiny.
Barnette, Wooley, and Hurley all failed the ends-means
balancing test. The Barnette Court concluded that the asserted
state interests of "teaching, fostering and perpetuating the ide-
als, principles and spirit of Americanism, and increasing the
knowledge of the organization and machinery of the govern-
ment" did not justify compelling students to recite the
Pledge. 1 3 The Court relied on affirmative First Amendment
law, holding that states could restrict free expression only if a
"clear and present danger" existed. 1 4 Significantly, the Court
determined that the government must present even stronger
interests to justify infringing negative free speech rights than
affirmative free speech rights. 1 5 The Court did not establish a
clear standard to determine when circumstances warranted in-
fringement of an individual's negative First Amendment rights,
however.1 6
Although the infringement of negative free speech rights in
Wooley, displaying a motto on a license plate, was less severe
than the required recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in Bar-
nette, Wooley shared Barnette's fate under the balancing test."7
The Court weighed the state interest in vehicle identification
against the Maynards' free speech rights and found that the
motto requirement did not further the goal of vehicle identifica-
tion because passenger vehicle license plates already bore dis-
tinct number and letter patterns. 1 8 Furthermore, New Hamp-
shire's interest in fostering "appreciation of history, state pride,
and individualism" did not justify the regulation, because
"where the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no
matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh
an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the
courier for such [a] message."" 9
113. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625 (1943).
114. See id. at 633.
115. See id. (reasoning that "[iut would seem that involuntary affirmation
could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than
silence").
116. See id. at 642 (holding that no circumstances exist that would justify a
governmental decree of "what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, relig-
ion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein").
117. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715-17 (1977).
118. See id. at 716.
119. Id. at 717.
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The Hurley decision also placed more value on negative
First Amendment rights than on the objectives behind Massa-
chusetts' anti-discrimination law.' 20 The Massachusetts legis-
lature designed the anti-discrimination statute as a means of
ensuring equal access to public accommodations for gays and
lesbians.' 21 The application of the anti-discrimination statute
to expressive activity had the practical effect of "requir[ing]
speakers to modify the content of their expression to whatever
extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with messages
of their own." 122 Thus, the state interest in applying the stat-
ute to expressive activity required citizens to modify their po-
litical speech. The Court found this interest uncompelling be-
cause it deprived the Council of autonomy over its speech. 123 In
fact, Justice Souter, writing for the court, hypothesized that an
additional justification for applying the statute to private ex-
pressive activity existed: to eliminate bias toward gays and les-
bians. 124 Souter, however, dismissed this interest as "decidedly
fatal":125
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to pro-
duce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed,
all people, grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing
less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expres-
sion. The Speech Clause has no more certain antithesis. While the
law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behav-
ior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one,
however enlightened either purpose may strike the government. 126
Thus, Hurley failed the balancing test on all grounds, and
states cannot require individuals to modify their speech for the
purpose of eliminating biases deemed politically incorrect. 127
The Court has, however, upheld some regulations found to
further compelling state interests. For instance, in Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, the Court found a compelling state
interest in maintaining labor peace.128 The case involved a bal-
120. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 580-81 (1995).
121. See id. at 578.
122. Id.
123. See id. (stating that requiring citizens to modify their speech "allow[s]
exactly what the general rule of speaker's autonomy forbids").
124. See id. at 578-79.
125. Id. at 579.
126. Id. (citations omitted).
127. See id. at 578-79.
128. See 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (noting that "[there can be no quarrel
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ancing of negative free speech rights and smooth labor rela-
tions with a teachers' union.129 The Detroit Federation of
Teachers, the exclusive representative of Detroit teachers' in-
terests,1 30 required mandatory dues payments to fund collective
bargaining and other activities. 131 The plaintiffs objected to the
union's use of their fees for collective bargaining and other
ideological purposes. 132 The Court found that collective bar-
gaining implicates First Amendment interests because employ-
ees might disagree with the ideological positions of the union's
negotiators. 133 For example, a pro-life teacher's abortion posi-
tion might not comport with that of the union negotiators. 134
Despite this infringement on negative free speech rights, the
Court ruled that the union could constitutionally compel teach-
ers to fund its collective bargaining activities because promot-
ing collective bargaining is a valid state interest. 135 Abood still
protected free speech rights because it distinguished between
two types of forced finding: constitutional funding for collective
bargaining activities and unconstitutional funding for ideologi-
cal activities unrelated to collective bargaining. 136 In turn, the
Court ruled that funding for ideological activities was only ac-
ceptable if the activities related to collective bargaining pur-
poses. 137
with the truism that because public employee unions attempt to influence gov-
ernmental policymaking, their activities-and the views of members who dis-
agree with them-may be properly termed political"). Although the Court rec-
ognized the political nature of collective bargaining, it still required members
to pay union dues for collective bargaining purposes. See id. at 236-37.
129. See id. at 233-37.
130. See id. at 211-12.
131. Teachers who failed to join the union within 60 days of being hired
were required to pay the union a service charge equal to the amount of union
dues. See id. at 212.
132. See id. at 213.
133. See id. at 222.
134. See id. Justice Stewart wrote that "[to be required to help finance the
union as a collective-bargaining agent might well be thought, therefore, to in-
terfere in some way with an employee's freedom to associate for the advance-
ment of ideas, or to refrain from doing so, as he sees fit." Id.
135. See id. at 225-26. The Union's exclusive representation of teachers'
interests expedited collective bargaining and avoided the confusion of varying
employment contracts. See id. at 220, 224. In addition, the Court found that
those who did not pay dues, but still received the benefits of collective bar-
gaining, could not "freeload" off of those who contributed. See id. at 222.
136. See id. at 236-37.
137. See id. at 235.
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The Court reasoned that the union's status as the exclusive
representative of teachers' interests simplified collective bar-
gaining issues. Maintaining the status quo avoided the prob-
lem of varying teacher employment contracts. 38 Moreover, the
rhandatory dues system prevented the "free rider" problem.
139
The Court defined "free riders" in the context of unions in Ellis
v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks as "em-
ployees who obtain[] the benefit of the union's participation [in
activities on their behalfl without financially supporting the
union."140 In other words, a "free rider" problem arises when
union members receive the benefits of collective bargaining,
such as higher salaries, without paying for the collective bar-
gaining activities that made these benefits possible. Failure to
pay union dues effectively amounts to "freeloading" off of one's
paying colleagues.
In Keller v. State Bar, the Court applied Abood's free rider
analysis. 141 Members of the California Bar sued the organiza-
tion, claiming it used mandatory dues to fund political and
ideological speech, 142 objecting mainly to the bar's public sup-
port for gun control and nuclear freeze plans. 143 The Court de-
termined that the bar could collect dues to avoid the free rider
problem, because all members benefited from the bar's stan-
dards for attorney discipline and admittance to practice. 1" The
bar could not, however, use dues for ideological or political pur-
poses unrelated to the improvement of the State's legal services
or the regulation of the legal profession. 145 Thus, under Keller,
forced funding of ideological speech unrelated to legitimate bar
functions violates the First Amendment. Although Abood and
Keller both involved forced financial support of ideological mes-
138. See id. at 220.
139. See id.
140. 466 U.S. 435, 446 (1986).
141. 496 U.S. 1, 12 (1990).
142. See id. at 4.
143. The California Bar used member dues to fid speech targeting a wide
array of controversial political issues. See id. at 5 n.2.
144. See id. at 12-14.
145. See id. at 14 (citing Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961)
(plurality opinion)). Questions persist, however, regarding which activities are
ideological and which activities are not. See id. at 15. Keller concretely estab-
lishes the "germaneness/relatedness" test as a means of determining which
activities private organizations may fund with mandatory dues. See id. at 13-
14. The Court held that "disciplining members of the Bar or proposing ethical
codes for the profession" were constitutional uses of mandatory dues, but the
promotion of gun control and nuclear freeze initiatives were not. Id. at 16.
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sages, First Amendment violations can also exist in other cir-
cumstances.
D. THE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE PROBLEM
Just as there is no right to compel an individual to fund
another's ideological speech, there is no right to compel an in-
dividual to listen to another's ideological speech. 46 The Su-
preme Court has allowed restrictions of affirmative expression
if the intended audience is "captive," or has no way to avoid
hearing a potentially objectionable message.1 47
The Court is therefore less likely to protect speech that
audiences cannot avoid. For example, in Frisby v. Schultz, the
Court barred pro-life demonstrators from protesting outside a
particular abortion provider's residence on the grounds that the
doctor's home was a sanctuary. 148 It found that "a special bene-
fit of privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls.., is an
ability to avoid intrusions," and that "[olne aspect of residential
privacy is protection of the unwilling listener."149 Similarly, in
Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., the Court restricted
the methods of communication available to pro-life protestors
who stationed themselves outside abortion facilities. 150 The
Court allowed the protestors to display pictures because those
inside the facility could close the drapes and avoid the mes-
sage.151 On the other hand, the Court restricted the protestors'
noise level because those inside the facility could not avoid the
protestors' sounds. 152
In contrast, if an unwilling listener can avoid receiving the
message, the regulation will not be upheld. For instance, in
Cohen v. California, the Court held that the petitioner's display
of potentially offensive words regarding the United States draft
constituted protected speech because those around him could
avoid the message simply by averting their eyes. 53 The Court
146. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974)
(holding that political candidates did not have a constitutional right to adver-
tise on streetcars because passengers are a captive audience to such political
campaign literature).
147. See id. at 302.
148. 487 U.S. 474, 484, 488 (1988).
149. Id. at 484-85.
150. 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994).
151. See id. at 773.
152. See id.
153. 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971).
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reached the same result in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
ruling that a drive-in movie theater could show nude pictures
because passing motorists could avert their eyes and thereby
avoid viewing the pictures.154 Finally, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., the Court held that individuals who found the
appellee's mailings about contraceptives offensive could simply
throw them in a garbage can.155
An individual must, however, have a realistic chance to
avoid receiving the message. For example, proposing that stu-
dents who do not want to listen to religious invocations at their
graduation ceremonies simply not attend permits avoidance of
the message only at a great personal cost and is therefore con-
trary to First Amendment protections. 156 In Lee v. Weisman, a
student's father sought to prevent the school board from con-
ducting a religious invocation at his daughter's high school
graduation because he felt she should not be forced to listen to
the prayer. 57 The school district contended that students could
avoid the prayer because district regulations did not require at-
tendance at graduation ceremonies. 58 The Court noted that
the attendance rule did not provide the student with a genuine
opportunity to avoid what she considered objectionable speech,
concluding "[e]veryone knows that in our society and in our cul-
ture high school graduation is one of life's most significant oc-
casions. A school rule which excuses attendance is beside the
point."159 In sum, one who chooses to avoid a particular mes-
sage cannot be deprived of some greater benefit or suffer un-
duly as a result of exercising autonomy over speech. Such a re-
sult violates the First Amendment. 60
154. 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975).
155. 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983).
156. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586, 594-95 (1992). Although the
Court decided the case on Establishment Clause grounds, it noted that the
safeguards for religion in the First Amendment "embracea a freedom of con-
science . . . that has close parallels in the speech provisions of the First,
Amendment...." Id. at 591.
157. Seeid. at 581, 584.
158. See id. at 594-95.
159. Id. at 595.
160. See id. at 595-96.
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II. THE ELIMINATION OF BIAS REQUIREMENT
VIOLATES LAWYERS' FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND
IS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED TO A COMPELLING
GOVERNMENT INTEREST
The Minnesota CLE elimination of bias requirement raises
a number of First Amendment concerns. The ideological nature
of race and sexual orientation issues, the captive audience
situation, and the dubious statistical underpinnings of the as-
serted state interest indicate that any type of judicial review
will at least find that the elimination of bias requirement im-
plicates First Amendment issues. Whether a reviewing court
will find a constitutional violation depends on how it views the
magnitude of the violation and how compelling it finds the
state interests.
This Note argues that the elimination of bias requirement
is unconstitutional because it seriously interferes with individ-
ual free speech rights and is not narrowly tailored to further
the asserted state interests. This Note will evaluate the re-
quirement according to the Supreme Court's methods of ana-
lyzing negative free speech cases. It will address freedom of
conscience, freedom of association, and the ends-means bal-
ancing test separately, concluding that the elimination of bias
requirement fails each of these tests.
A. THE ELIMINATION OF BIAS RULE MUST BE JUDGED ON ITS
FACE, NOT ITS IMPLEMENTATION
The seemingly benign implementation of the elimination of
bias rule belies the deeper dangers inherent in government
regulation that targets private attitudes. The rule allows gov-
ernment regulation of private opinion from a particular view-
point and is therefore facially invalid, regardless of how it is
implemented.
The argument that the elimination of bias courses do not
target private attitudes is correct but incomplete. The elimina-
tion of bias seminars present workshop-type sessions in which
facilitators encourage attendees to treat their colleagues with
respect.161 For example, co-workers should not avoid each
161. See Videotape: Eliminating Bias: Why Bother (Minnesota Continuing
Legal Education & David Hunt 1998) (on file with Minnesota Continuing Le-
gal Education). In this video of an elimination of bias CLE, attorney and pri-
vate diversity trainer David Hunt prefaces his presentation with a caveat that
the term "elimination of bias" is a misnomer, and that it is unrealistic to ex-
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other at the office and should not unduly criticize each others'
mistakes. 162 Proponents of the rule would be correct in assert-
ing that as thus far implemented, many of the elimination of
bias seminars are little more than training in manners and eti-
quette.
Training in etiquette and common courtesy, however, is not
the outer limit of what the rule allows. If the rule's authors
merely desired that lawyers attend courses about manners and
civility, it seems odd that they would name the program "elimi-
nation of bias." The program's name, along with its express
goal of educating attorneys about the "elimination of bias or
prejudice in the legal profession," 163 show that the rule allows
seminars to attempt to change personal attitudes. The video-
taped courses are not particularly objectionable, but they
barely tap into the more objectionable resources of the race and
sexual orientation reports. The agenda and course materials of
the October 26, 1999 elimination of bias course, entitled "Ho-
mophobia and Sexual Orientation Issues in the Workplace,"
demonstrate that other courses do draw on these questionable
reports. 16
Elimination of personal bias has been declared a suspect
government interest. The Hurley Court ruled that in the con-
text of free expression, elimination of personal bias could never
be a legitimate state interest.165 The analysis undertaken by
the Supreme Court in Hurley applies to the elimination of bias
requirement because attending classes is expressive activity in
that it facilitates Board-approved speech.166 The Court charac-
terized parades as expressive activities because they promul-
gate messages. 16 7 If no one watches a parade, the parade is
pect all biases to be eliminated. See id. He adds the caveat that people will
walk out of the seminar with their biases intact. See id.
162. See id.
163. Bias Order, supra note 1, at 7.
164. See generally Robert W. Sykora, Homophobia and Sexual Orientation
Issues in the Workplace (on file with author) (including excerpts from the sex-
ual orientation report in the CLE course materials); SEXUAL ORIENTATION
REPORT, supra note 7. The course materials encouraged law firms to require
employees to view Inside Out, supra note 30. See Sykora, supra, at 6.
165. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 578-79 (1995). Hurley held that a private group of parade organizers
could not be compelled to include a gay and lesbian group in their parade. See
id. at 580-81.
166. Facilitation of speech can be considered expressive activity. See
Kamenshine, supra note 56, at 102.
167. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568-69.
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pointless. If no one attends a political candidate's campaign
speech, the candidate might as well go home without saying a
word. Likewise, if no one attends elimination of bias seminars,
the State will be unable to communicate its message. Just as
the government cannot compel individuals to facilitate a
group's communication by watching its parade, the State can-
not compel lawyers to facilitate its speech by listening to elimi-
nation of bias seminars. The elimination of bias requirement is
unconstitutional on its face because its objective is to influence
lawyers' private biases and prejudices, areas that are not sub-
ject to governmental regulation.
The elimination of bias rule allows not only regulation of
private opinion but also regulation from a particular viewpoint,
which creates an additional First Amendment problem.1 68 The
Board decides which elimination of bias courses to accredit. If
the Board's decisions were viewpoint-neutral, it would have to
approve courses dedicated to the furtherance of bias in the legal
system.1 69 It is highly unlikely that the Board would accredit
an elimination of bias course that promoted private biases. 70
For example, the course materials from an elimination of bias
CLE about "homophobia" in the workplace advocate that firms
encourage employees to write about sexual orientation is-
sues. 171 A viewpoint-neutral interpretation of this suggestion
would allow lawyers to write about such issues from the per-
spective that same-sex sexual behavior is "wrong," but this re-
168. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1992) (striking a
viewpoint-based regulation of speech); cf Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis.
System v. Southworth, 120 S. Ct. 1346, 1349 (2000) (holding that "the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin may sustain the extracurricular dimensions of its programs
by using mandatory student fees with viewpoint neutrality as the operational
principle"); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995) ("[Wlhen the government targets not subject matter, but par-
ticular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First
Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egre-
gious form of content discrimination." (citations omitted)).
169. See Appellants' Reply Brief at 18-19, Greenberg v. State Bar, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 493 (Ct. App. 2000) (No. 682931-9).
170. The single instance in which the Board approved the Minnesota Fam-
ily Council's June 29, 1999 elimination of bias seminar is insufficient to sup-
port a possible claim of viewpoint-neutrality for the Board. See Bias in the Le-
gal Profession? What Bias?, 5 PRO-FAMILY NEWS (Minnesota Family Council,
St. Anthony, MN), June 1999 (noting the seminar and listing among included
faculty Tom Pritchard of the Minnesota Family Council, Roger Magnuson of
Dorsey and Whitney, and Greg Pulles and Scott Johnson, both of TCF Corp.);
see also infra notes 176-77.
171. See generally Sykora, supra note 164.
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sult would be inconsistent with the express purpose of the
elimination of bias rule.
A hidden constitutional danger lies in the fact that the
Board has unchecked authority to pick and choose which
courses to accredit. Such discretion is constitutionally relevant
because the Supreme Court has consistently held that making
"the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution
guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official"
is unconstitutional. 172 In Kunz v. New York, the Court ruled
that the New York'City Police Commissioner's sole discretion to
grant or deny permits for public religious gatherings operated
as an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech. 173 In
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, the Court held that giv-
ing the Birmingham City Commission "unbridled and absolute
power to prohibit any 'parade,' 'procession,' or 'demonstration'"
amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint. 174 Also, in
Saia v. New York, the Court determined that requiring indi-
viduals to obtain permits from the police chief in order to use
amplifiers also constituted a prior restraint. 7 5 These rulings
apply to the situation at hand because the Board has full dis-
cretion to determine the viewpoints of the ideological messages
attorneys must listen to in order to retain their licenses to
practice law. Thus, Minnesota lawyers may suffer freedom of
conscience and freedom of association violations at the will of
an administrative body.
The alternative to allowing the Board discretion to accredit
courses is directing the Board to "rubber stamp" all proposed
elimination of bias courses. If the Board blindly approved all
elimination of bias courses from both sides of the ideological
spectrum, however, lawyers would attend seminars that rein-
forced their own viewpoints, thwarting the rule's purpose. The
Minnesota Family Council's course provided just such an in-
stance. 176 As Peter Swanson observes, "[in order to change at-
titudes, the Board of Continuing Legal Education would have
to ascertain each attorney's bias and send him or her to the ap-
propriate diversity trainer."177 This approach would render the
172. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958).
173. 340 U.S. 290, 290-91, 293 (1951).
174. 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969).
175. 334 U.S. 558, 560 (1948).
176. See Bias in the Legal Profession, supra note 16.
177. Statement of Peter A. Swanson at 6, In re Amendment of Rules for
Continuing Legal Education of Members of the Bar (1995) (C2-84-2163) (on
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entire elimination of bias program unworkable. It would not
only create an administrative nightmare, but also provoke
strong disapproval-the State would need to classify lawyers
according to their private biases and send them to the "appro-
priate" seminars. The Board will necessarily violate lawyers'
First Amendment rights no matter how it implements the
elimination of bias rule. The Board can either make the rule so
effective that it suffocates freedom of conscience, or so dilute
the rule that it loses all coherent criteria. Either approach is
defective under the First Amendment.
The arguments directed toward the rule's implementation
are not tenable because they avoid confronting the rule itself.
The unobjectionable nature of a handful of seminars and the
approval of a solitary course criticizing the rule do not make
the rule constitutional. The fact remains that the status quo
allows the Board to approve courses designed to change law-
yers' attitudes regarding important social issues.
B. THE ELIMINATION OF BIAS REQUIREMENT VIOLATES
LAWYERS' FREEDOMS OF CONSCIENCE AND ASSOCIATION
1. Freedom of Conscience
The elimination of bias rule violates lawyers' freedom of
conscience because it allows the State to prescribe "acceptable"
attitudes regarding controversial social issues and compels
lawyers to listen to these prescriptions. State prescription of
particular viewpoints is a violation of freedom of conscience in
and of itself,178 whereas neither coerced affirmation of a belief
nor actual agreement with a belief are essential elements of
freedom of conscience violations. 179 For instance, it was uncer-
tain in Barnette whether the flag salute ceremony required the
students to change their views, or whether the students could
simply perform the ritual while retaining their opinions. 180 In
other words, the Supreme Court realized that reciting the
Pledge would not necessarily change the students' views about
the flag.181 Thus, even though the students in Barnette had the
file with author).
178. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (holding that the school board could not compel objecting Jehovah's
Witnesses to salute the United States flag).
179. See id.
180. See id. at 633.
181. See id.
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freedom to remain unconvinced, the Court still upheld their
negative free speech rights.182 Likewise, although lawyers need
only attend seminars and need not agree with the ideas the
seminars express, 183 they still suffer freedom of conscience vio-
lations due to the government prescription of orthodox views.184
Furthermore, the Court has struck down regulations as
violations of freedom of conscience even though the objecting
individual did not have to utter potentially objectionable
speech. For example, in Lee v. Weisman, the student only ob-
jected to having to listen to an invocation at her graduation
ceremony. 185 The Court rejected that requirement, even though
the school did not compel the student body to join the recitation
of the prayer. 86 Thus, neither required recitation of objection-
able speech nor required adoption of an objectionable idea are
prerequisites for freedom of conscience violations. The mere
existence of government prescription of "correct" attitudes vio-
lates lawyers' First Amendment rights. 187
The right to conscience extends beyond matters of religious
faith to encompass matters of personal opinion. For example,
although the coercion in Barnette dealt with personal religious
issues, the Court broadened its holding to recognize that indi-
viduals who did not share the plaintiffs' faith could also raise
legitimate objections to required participation in the cere-
mony. 88 Freedom of conscience fiecessarily encompasses the
subordinate right of basing one's opinions on any foundation. 189
An individual lawyer may therefore object to elimination of bias
training on any freedom of conscience grounds; objections need
not stem solely from an individual's religious beliefs. 90 Mat-
182. See id. at 633-34.
183. See Bias Order, supra note 1, at 7. The learning goals do not state
that the lawyers must agree with the ideas presented at the seminars. See id.
184. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
185. 505 U.S. 577, 584 (1992).
186. See id.
187. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
188. See id. at 634.
189. The standard for determining whether an individual's freedom of con-
science has been violated is subjective. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 574-75 (1995) (accepting as constitu-
tionally sufficient the Council's reasons for excluding the homosexual group
from the parade).
190. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634-35.
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ters of personal opinion are sufficient to trigger First Amend-
ment violations.191
The First Amendment violations of the elimination of bias
rule are compounded by the fact that the seminars make law-
yers a captive audience to Board-approved speech. Lawyers
may only take approved elimination of bias courses and can
only avoid the courses at great personal cost.192 Granted, indi-
viduals receive constant exposure to diverse messages simply
by virtue of venturing out in public and cannot claim violations
of constitutional rights every time they see or hear something
they find objectionable. As the Court reasoned in Erznoznik,
"[tihe plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our plural-
istic society, constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms
of expression, 'we are inescapably captive audiences for many
purposes."' 193 Lawyers do not find themselves at elimination of
bias seminars by chance, however. Rather, they attend elimi-
nation of bias seminars because they need to keep their licenses
to practice law.194 Thus, the rule's constitutionality is ques-
tionable because lawyers have no realistic option to avoid the
training.
2. Freedom of Association
The elimination of bias requirement violates lawyers' free-
dom of association because third parties may link Board-
approved ideas with individual lawyers, thereby denying law-
yers the right to represent themselves to the world in the man-
191. See id. at 642.
192. The Court's line of patronage cases presents some analogous situa-
tions. The Court has held that individuals cannot be deprived of their jobs for
holding political opinions contrary to those of a certain party. See Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976) (holding that public employees could not be
threatened with the loss of their jobs for not espousing the views of the Demo-
cratic Party, noting that "[tihe cost of the practice of patronage is the restraint
it places on freedoms of belief and association," and that "[tihe financial and
campaign assistance that [the employee] is induced to provide to another party
furthers the advancement of that party's policies to the detriment of his
party's views and ultimately his own beliefs"); cf Rutan v. Republican Party,
497 U.S. 62, 74 (1990) (finding that stagnant wages and decreased job satis-
faction as a result of maintaining one's political beliefs are 'significant penal-
ties and are imposed for the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment").
193. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210 (1974) (quoting
Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970)).
194. The elimination of bias requirement is mandatory. See Bias Order,
supra note 1, at 1-3 (citing the minimum requirements for CLE courses).
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ner they desire. Lawyers are then left without any viable
means to correct this misperception.
The Supreme Court's distinction in Keller between union
dues and tax dollars illustrates why third parties might rea-
sonably attribute Board-approved speech to lawyers, thus de-
nying lawyers control of their public personas. The Keller
Court ruled that California lawyers could opt out of funding
their bar's political and ideological speech, 195 noting that the
California Bar resembled a labor union rather than an elected
government. 196 This distinction is important because the gov-
ernment serves the entire population. 197 Government speech
funded by tax dollars is unlikely to be attributed to taxpayers
because the government serves people as a whole. 198 Because
labor unions serve narrow segments of the population, how-
ever, third parties will be more likely to attribute their speech
to union members. 199 In Keller, the Court solved this problem
195. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990).
196. As the unanimous Court explained:
The State Bar of California is a good deal different from most other
entities that would be regarded in common parlance as "governmental
agencies." Its principal funding comes, not from appropriations made
to it by the legislature, but from dues levied on its members by the
board of governors. Only lawyers admitted to practice in the State of
California are members of the State Bar, and all 122,000 lawyers ad-
mitted to practice in the State must be members.
Id. at 11. The Court also held that the State Bar of California had "very spe-
cialized characteristics." Id. at 12.
197. See id. at 11.
198. The dues paid to bar associations are not "homogenized" the way gov-
ernment taxes are. See Brudney, supra note 72, at 16. Similarly, the Prune-
Yard mall was open to the general public. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 89 (1980).
199. In his concurrence in Abood, Justice Powell argued that members of
private organizations had the constitutional right to refuse to pay dues which
fimded activities they considered objectionable:
Compelled support of a private association is fundamentally dif-
ferent from compelled support of government. Clearly, a local school
board does not need to demonstrate a compelling state interest every
time it spends a taxpayer's money in ways the taxpayer finds abhor-
rent. But the reason for permitting the government to compel the
payment of taxes and to spend money on controversial projects is that
the government is representative of the people. The same cannot be
said of a union, which is representative only of one segment of the
population, with certain common interests. The withholding of finan-
cial support is fully protected as speech in this context.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., con-
curring), cited in James B. Lake, Lawyers, Please Check Your First Amend-
ment Rights at the Bar: The Problem of State-Mandated Bar Dues and Com-
pelled Speech, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1833, 1857 n.185 (1993). But cf Bates
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by allowing lawyers to refuse to pay dues to bar associations
when the dues fund ideological activities unrelated to the
regulation or improvement of legal services in the state.2°° Al-
though no financial issues exist in the controversy surrounding
the elimination of bias requirement, the comparison with Keller
applies in the present case because the Minnesota court's order
resembles the actions of the California Bar rather than those of
an elected government. The narrower the organization, the
more likely its speech will be attributed to its members. Third
parties might attribute Board-approved speech to lawyers be-
cause the Board exclusively controls elimination of bias semi-
nars.
In addition, the characteristics of the elimination of bias
requirement demonstrate that the public is likely to attribute
Board-approved speech to Minnesota lawyers. In Keller, the
bar's most objectionable activities were lobbying and publicly
supporting certain controversial initiatives. 20' The bar did not
encourage lawyers to agree with its positions. Instead of com-
pelling lawyers to attend classes directing them to support nu-
clear freezes and gun control, the California Bar merely re-
quired lawyers to fund its speech in favor of these initiatives. 20 2
The elimination of bias rule, on the other hand, not only com-
pels lawyers' physical presence at sessions for the purpose of
expressing approved views, it also encourages lawyers to agree
with these views.203 When a group that represents a narrow
segment of the population tells its members what to think, its
speech is reasonably attributable to those members. 2°4 This at-
tribution results in lawyers losing their right to tailor their
public images as they see fit.
The connection between Board-approved speech and indi-
vidual lawyers is as strong as other connections the Court has
found between coerced speakers and perceived objectionable
messages. For example, even though all New Hampshire driv-
ers had to display the state motto on their license plates, the
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 369-72 (1977) (invalidating a rule prohibiting at-
torney advertising, reasoning that the advertising would not negatively affect
the quality of legal services or attorney professionalism).
200. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 14.
201. See id. at 5-6 n.2.
202. See id. at 5.
203. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
204. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 11; see also Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring).
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Wooley Court still considered the motto traceable to each indi-
vidual driver.20 5 Likewise, third parties may attribute Board-
approved speech to individual lawyers even though the re-
quirement does not single out certain lawyers as being in par-
ticular need of having their biases eliminated. In Keller, the
Court found that California lawyers could refuse to fund their
bar's non-germane, ideological speech despite the fact that the
general public was likely unaware of the bar's activities.206 A
general lack of public awareness about the elimination of bias
requirement does not remove the danger of another lawyer at-
tributing Board-sanctioned opinions to an associate who at-
tended a seminar. Similarly, a prospective client could request
that a lawyer provide a list of professional development activi-
ties he has attended and could thereby discover that the lawyer
attended an elimination of bias session. The client could then
attribute Board-approved views to the lawyer, consequently
putting the lawyer in the position of having to correct the cli-
ent's understandable misperception.
Lawyers who lose control over their public images have two
avenues of recourse: remain silent, or publicly disavow the
elimination of bias training. Neither option will restore auton-
omy to lawyers. The choice to remain silent undermines
autonomy over speech because the public has already attrib-
uted the bar's speech to its members.20 7 Failure to correct the
misrepresentation will perpetuate it, thus depriving lawyers of
the right to represent themselves to the world.208 Disavowal is
205. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).
206. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 17.
207. "Otherwise stated, one 'cannot unring a bell'; 'after the thrust of the
saber it is difficult to say forget the wound' .... " Dunn v. United States, 307
F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
208. The concurring justices in PruneYard would likely agree with this
point. In his opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justice White, argued that "[t]o
require a landowner to supply a forum for causes he finds objectionable also
might be an unacceptable 'compelled subsidization' in some circumstances."
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 98 n.2 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (citing Abood, 431 U.S. at 237). Powell's and White's concurrence
highlights the connection between freedom of association analysis and freedom
of conscience analysis-to avoid association with a message, an individual
must disavow it. The act of disavowal, however, deprives the individual of the
opportunity to exercise the right not to speak:
The property owner or proprietor would be faced with a choice: he ei-
ther could permit his customers to receive a mistaken impression or
he could disavow the messages. Should he take the first course, he ef-
fectively has been compelled to affirm someone else's belief. Should
he choose the second, he has been forced to speak when he would pre-
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not an appropriate solution because it is itself coerced speech.20 9
An individual must disavow the message out of necessity, not
free will.2 10 The disavowal of elimination of bias training has
negative consequences for attorneys because it places them in
the vulnerable position of having others know their personal
opinions when they would rather have kept them private.211
Although the PruneYard Court held that disavowal was an
appropriate remedy,212 PruneYard is a fact-driven case that
does not apply to this situation. A mall such as the one in
PruneYard is similar to an elected government in that both
"represent" the public as a whole.213 The government repre-
sents the general public, and the mall caters to the general
public.214 Because the mall was open to protestors of all mes-
sages and viewpoints, a disavowal of all protestors' messages
would not trace the mall owner to any particular cause or ini-
tiative. On the other hand, if only one ideological group pro-
tested at the mall, then disavowal would expose the owner's
personal biases.
fer to remain silent. In short, he has lost control over his freedom to
speak or not to speak on certain issues.
Id. at 99. Powell and White offer the example of minority-owned businesses
that might be forced to allow the American Nazi Party to disseminate its views
on their private property and church-based businesses that might be forced to
allow pro-choice protests on their property. These circumstances would be un-
acceptable because they would virtually compel a business owner to disavow
them. See id. at 99-100.
209. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 99 (arguing that "[tihe mere fact that he is
free to dissociate himself from the views expressed on his property... cannot
restore his 'right to refrain from speaking at all.'" (citing Wooley v. Maynard
430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977))) (Powell, J., concurring).
210. Forced disavowal, by definition, is not a voluntary act. See id. at 99.
211. Forced disavowal has the negative effect of placing the individual in
the vulnerable position of having personal biases disclosed to the world. As
Justice Powell wrote in his concurrence in Abood:
Disclosure of the specific causes to which an individual employee
is opposed (which necessarily discloses, by negative implication, those
causes the employee does support) may subject him to "economic re-
prisal,... threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of
public hostility," and might dissuade him from exercising the right to
withhold support "because of fear of exposure of [his] beliefs ... and of
the consequences of this exposure."
Abood, 431 U.S. at 241 n.42 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958)).
212. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88.
213. See id. at 87 (noting that the mall was open to the public).
214. See id.; see also Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring).
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The suggestion that an offended lawyer simply disavow all
continuing legal education will not weaken the link between
the lawyer and elimination of bias training. Unlike the pre-
sumably diverse ideological messages promulgated by protes-
tors in the PruneYard mall, elimination of bias seminars are
the only ideological component of the continuing legal educa-
tion program. The elimination of bias seminars stand in stark
contrast to the rest of the continuing legal education curricu-
lum, which deals with non-ideological subjects like contracts,
torts, or trial practice. It would be absurd for a lawyer to dis-
avow training in trial practice techniques or recent develop-
ments in insurance law. As a result, the public will connect the
lawyer's full-scale disavowal of continuing legal education with
the elimination of bias requirement. The lawyer's opinions will
still be publicly known.
C. THE ELIMINATION OF BIAS REQUIREMENT FAILS THE ENDS-
MEANS BALANCING TEST
The elimination of bias requirement is an unduly restric-
tive means of improving the quality of justice in Minnesota.
The alleged compelling interests supporting the rule do not jus-
tify violating lawyers' First Amendment rights, even for a short
time period.215 Narrower means are available that target law-
yers' overt actions instead of their private thoughts.
Although the Supreme Court allowed infringements of
negative free speech rights in Abood and Keller, the elimination
of bias rule is distinguishable. Abood allowed infringement of
negative free speech rights to foster smooth labor relations and
avert the free rider problem. 216 Similarly, Keller partially justi-
fied infringement of negative free speech rights to avoid the
same issue.217 The elimination of bias requirement does not
raise questions of free ridership or collective bargaining. Min-
nesota's lawyers are not deriving any collective bargaining
benefits from attending these seminars, whereas the members
215. A mere two hours of training every three years is arguably a negligi-
ble First Amendment violation. Indeed, as attorney Mark Greenberg notes,
"there has been a tendency.., to dismiss the complaints here as a sort of legal
hypochondria, given the nugatory imposition and the beneficent purposes in-
volved." Petition, supra note 14, at 13. But see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
373 (1976) (holding that the "[loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury").
216. SeeAbood, 431 U.S. at 225.
217. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12 (1990).
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of the California Bar benefited from its administrative actions
on their behalf.218 The rationale for upholding the regulations
in Abood and Keller does not apply to the elimination of bias
requirement.
The elimination of bias rule fails both prongs of the ends-
means balancing test applied in Barnette, Wooley, and Hurley.
The strict scrutiny version of the balancing test should apply
because the free speech violations inherent in the elimination
of bias requirement are worse than those in Keller. The Cali-
fornia Bar merely used mandatory dues to fund its ideological
speech.219 The Minnesota Board not only takes lawyers' CLE
admissions fees and uses them to fund ideological speech, but
also mandates that lawyers, in order to maintain their licenses,
submit to a course that has the goal of changing their attitudes
about important social issues. These weighty restrictions were
not present in Keller. The Board does not have a compelling in-
terest that justifies the elimination of bias requirement because
the criticisms of the race and sexual orientation bias studies
diminish the government's claim that there is an overwhelming
need for elimination of bias training.220 Moreover, the Court
has specifically held that manipulation of private opinion, re-
gardless of the social desirability of the message, is a "decidedly
fatal" objective.221
One gray area surrounding the elimination of bias re-
quirement and the balancing test is Keller's germaneness
test.222 Keller held that the only ideological activities lawyers
must fund are those that are related to the regulation of the le-
gal profession or the improvement of the quality of legal serv-
ices in the state.223 Germaneness analysis does not validate the
elimination of bias requirement because it is only one part of a
multi-step inquiry. Although courts recognize that "germane-
218. See id.
219. See id. at 6.
220. See supra notes 16-40 and accompanying text (criticizing the bias
studies).
221. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 579 (1995).
222. Keller established principles for evaluating the legitimacy of bar ex-
penditures, holding that "the guiding standard must be whether the chal-
lenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of
regulating the legal profession or 'improving the quality of legal service avail-
able to the people of the state.'" Keller, 496 U.S. at 14 (citations omitted).
223. See id. at 13-14.
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ness" has its limits, 224 a designation of germaneness is, admit-
tedly, not particularly hard to obtain. Indeed, phrases like "in
the legal profession" and "the practice of law" could justify vir-
tually any regulation touching on lawyers' professional lives.225
For instance, the elimination of slovenly dressing "in the legal
profession" would be germane to improving the quality of jus-
tice in the state because well-dressed lawyers would make bet-
ter impressions on judges, jurors, and clients. Likewise, the
elimination of tardiness "in the legal profession" would be ger-
mane to improving the quality of justice in the state because it
would further judicial efficiency.226 As one attorney said of the
elimination of bias requirement, "[t]he bar should not be man-
datory on this. What is next?"227 Even if a reviewing court
finds that elimination of bias seminars are germane to im-
proving the quality of justice in the state, First Amendment
analysis also requires the elimination of bias rule to satisfy the
least restrictive means requirement.
The wide breadth of germaneness is constitutionally rele-
vant because, strictly applied, it would allow for violations of
First Amendment rights. As the court noted in Gibson v. State
Bar, using such a broad standard to "determine permissible bar
activity would be tantamount to a complete abdication of the
court's duty to protect dissenting attorneys' First Amendment
rights."228 For example, a finding that elimination of Commu-
nist ideology from the legal profession would improve the qual-
ity of legal services in the state would ostensibly justify manda-
tory continuing legal education classes disparaging communism
and lauding capitalism.
224. The Court adopted an elastic definition of germaneness in Lehnert v.
Ferris Faculty Ass'n. See 500 U.S. 507, 524 (1991) (holding that the Ferris
Faculty Association "may charge objecting employees for their pro rata share
of the costs associated with otherwise chargeable activities.., even if those
activities were not performed for the direct benefit of the objecting employees'
bargaining unit"). But cf Keller, 496 U.S. at 13, 16 (holding certain bar ex-
penditures were unrelated to the regulation of California lawyers).
225. See Petition, supra note 14, at 10.
226. Greenberg provides further examples of the wide breadth of germane-
ness, asking whether the perception that attorneys are unscrupulous warrants
mandatory "classes on rectitude and moral virtue 'in the legal profession," or
whether "the amount of paper wasted by lawyers" would "justify a mandatory
class on environmental abuse 'in the legal profession." Id.
227. ELIMINATION OF BIAS REPORT, supra note 42, at 6.
228. Gibson v. State Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1569 (11th Cir. 1986), cited in Pe-
tition, supra note 14, at 10.
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The least restrictive means requirement does not permit
violations of First Amendment rights in the name of "germane-
ness." As the First Circuit stated in Schneider v. Colegio de
Abogados de Puerto Rico:
One can hardly conceive of loftier goals in a democratic society than
creating a strongly pluralistic society and improving the administra-
tion of justice. And yet broad statements such as these cannot form
the basis for an infringement of First Amendment rights. If used at
all they must be narrowly tailored n 9
The court in Gibson recognized this two-part requirement,
noting that "[alll first amendment challenges are analyzed un-
der a two-part test that requires a 'compelling interest' and the
'least restrictive means' of achieving that interest."230 The
elimination of bias requirement is not the least restrictive
means of eliminating discriminatory behavior in the legal sys-
tem because it attempts to preemptively change lawyers' biases
before they commit discriminatory acts.231 The elimination of
bias requirement fails the strict scrutiny ends-means test be-
cause there are less restrictive alternatives available that
solely regulate attorneys' overt behavior and do not enter the
realm of private thought.
III. ALTERNATIVE MEANS EXIST
TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION IN THE
MINNESOTA LEGAL COMMUNITY
There are a variety of alternative superior ways to combat
discrimination in the legal system short of attempting to influ-
ence lawyers' attitudes. The state should strive to eliminate
discrimination in the legal profession by relying on existing
measures that punish discriminatory actions. These measures
satisfy the First Amendment requirement of narrow tailoring.
A number of current laws already serve the bar's aim of
eliminating discrimination in the legal system. The state
should seek aggressive enforcement of the Minnesota Human
Rights Act (MHRA), which protects virtually the same classes
229. Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 917 F.2d 620, 638
(1st Cir. 1990), cited in Petition, supra note 14, at 10.
230. Gibson, 798 F.2d at 1569, cited in Petition, supra note 14, at 10.
231. Cf Near v. Minnesota 283 U.S. 697, 720 (1931) ("The fact that the lib-
erty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not
make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from previous restraint
in dealing with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses
as may exist is the appropriate remedy....").
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that the elimination of bias rule endeavors to protect.232 The
MHRA is relevant to legal services because it operates in an
employment context, forbidding discrimination in hiring, pro-
motion, and retention.233 Similarly, Rules 8.4(g) and (h) of the
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit harassment
and other discriminatory acts.234 The Board should also en-
courage lawyers to follow Rule 8.4(d)'s prohibition of "conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, 2 35 and com-
ply with the mandatory reporting requirement if they witness
discriminatory behavior.236 Finally, the effectiveness of these
rules could be enhanced by advocating more severe conse-
quences for those who violate them. If existing rules do not
adequately deal with discrimination, the State should work to
change them, not lawyers' private thoughts.
In addition, the Board should increase awareness of the
requirements of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which target behavior rather than private attitudes. For ex-
ample, the Model Rules do not prevent a lawyer from thinking
that it is acceptable to engage in unethical behavior. Rule
1.15(b) states that "a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the cli-
ent.., any funds or other property that the client or third per-
son is entitled to receive."237 Thus, a lawyer may believe that it
is acceptable to steal client funds, but as long as the lawyer
232. The MHRA provides employment protection regardless of "race, color,
creed, religious, national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to
public assistance, disability, sexual orientation, or age...." MINN. STAT.
§ 363.03 (1998).
233. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03(1)(c).
234. Minnesota Rules 8.4(g) and (h) prohibit discriminatory actions:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(g) harass a person on the basis of sex, race, age, creed, religion,
color, national origin, disability, sexual preference or marital status
in connection with a lawyer's professional activities;
(h) commit a discriminatory act, prohibited by federal, state or lo-
cal statute or ordinance, that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness
as a lawyer.
MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 8.4(g) & (h) (1998).
235. See id. Rule 8.4(d). The Comment to the Model Rules counterpart of
8.4(d), amended in 1998, states that a lawyer violates Rule 8.4(d) if the lawyer
"in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or con-
duct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disabil-
ity, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status" and "when such actions
are prejudicial to the administration of justice." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 cmt. (1998).
236. See MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) (1998).
237. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15(b) (1983).
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does not actually commit the act of stealing, no violation of the
rule occurs. The Model Rules are less restrictive than the
elimination of bias rule because they have little potential for
restricting personal thought and do not make private biases the
target of state regulation.
These solutions will still allow the legal community a wide
range of methods to combat discrimination. Although the State
may not require attendance, lawyers who enjoy elimination of
bias seminars are free to take them as often as they wish, and
the bar remains free to speak its own mind regarding matters
of bias and discrimination in the legal profession.2 38 For exam-
ple, the bar could publish and distribute statistics of the per-
centages of minorities working at law firms and publicly honor
firms that make strides in hiring lawyers from diverse back-
grounds.239 Indeed, the bar might even be able to use manda-
tory dues for this purpose.240 Mentoring relationships will help
firms retain minority attorneys without dictating to other law-
yers what they ought to be thinking. Additionally, firms should
be encouraged rigorously to enforce strict policies against racial
and sexual harassment.
Many of the same solutions apply to the Minnesota court
system and individual attorney-client relationships. Firms
should exhort their lawyers to treat clients equally, regardless
of their private biases. Likewise, the State should encourage
its court personnel to treat everyone equally, making all defen-
dants aware of their rights under the MHRA.
The State could also fix the rule's constitutional difficulties
by amending the rule itself. Some Minnesota lawyers object to
the fact that the court mandates attendance at the seminars.
As one attorney stated, "I strongly disagree that the Supreme
Court has mandated this course. I already believe that all peo-
238. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) ("The Government can,
without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage
certain activities it believes to be in the public interest... ."). As the Court
noted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no
such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we de-
pend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas." 418 U.S. 323, 339-340 (1974).
239. For example, the law firm of Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, and Bennett
recently received a diversity award. See Gray Plant Mooty (visited March 28,
2000) <http'//www.gpmlaw.com/cgi-bin/navobjs?template=templatehome.
htm&recno=38template=template.htm>.
240. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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ple should be treated with respect and dignity . *.".. 241 If the
State does not intend the rule to target private biases, it should
clarify the rule's purpose and replace references to elimination
of personal bias with references to politeness and civil toler-
ance. On the other hand, assuming the State genuinely wants
to target private biases, it could make elimination of bias semi-
nars voluntary.
The bar should commission more studies of discriminatory
behavior in the legal system and take care to avoid even the
appearance that those conducting the studies allowed their in-
dividual biases to influence the results. The groups of people
conducting the studies should exhibit a wide variety of view-
points, affiliations, and ideological interests. The studies will
not then be so easily subject to allegations of bias. Even with
accurate studies, however, the State must still satisfy the con-
stitutional requirement that any remedy be narrowly tailored
to eliminate discriminatory behavior.
Despite good intentions behind the rule, it is not the least
restrictive means of eliminating discrimination in the legal
community. Personal bias is an area of individual autonomy
that the law may not constitutionally control, 242 even if chang-
ing those biases might change some discriminatory behavior.
The elimination of bias rule violates the principle that the gov-
ernment may punish wrong actions, but not "wrong" thoughts.
The moment "wrong" thoughts and biases manifest themselves
through discriminatory actions the law may clamp down with
impunity,243 but "short of malfeasance, [a lawyer's] thoughts
are his own."244  The State should invoke current anti-
discrimination law to combat discrimination in the legal com-
munity rather than rely on a program that unduly burdens
lawyers' free speech rights. Punishing bigoted behavior is the
least restrictive means of encouraging lawyers, at least in their
professional roles, to treat all groups of people with respect.
CONCLUSION
The elimination of bias requirement is unconstitutional be-
cause of its potential to violate lawyers' First Amendment
241. ELIMINATION OF BIAS REPORT, supra note 42, at 7.
242. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515
U.S. 557, 579 (1995).
243. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 490 (1993) (upholding a state
law enhancing sentences for crimes motivated by racial bias).
244. See Petition, supra note 14, at 12.
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rights. It interferes with lawyers' freedom of conscience be-
cause it dictates what they ought to be thinking about impor-
tant social issues. The narrow membership of the Minnesota
Bar effectively credits Board-approved speech to its member
lawyers, thus interfering with their right to free association
and their ability to control their public personas. The First
Amendment protects the right of individuals to think as they
wish and forbids government interference with personal opin-
ions and belief systems. The elimination of bias requirement,
though well intentioned, invades the protected area of private
though and is therefore repugnant to the First Amendment.
Instead, the state should apply the full force of anti-
discrimination law to eliminate discriminatory behavior in the
legal profession.
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